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1 INTRODUCTION 
Navigation of Arctic waters has always been 
challenging. Large-scale maritime disasters, such as 
the Titanic and Exxon Valdez incidents have shown 
with all clarity the enormous consequences in terms 
of loss of human life and environmental damage if 
things go wrong in the harsh conditions in the Arctic.  
During the last decades climate change has 
improved conditions for maritime navigation and 
exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic and has 
consequently led to increased sea-based activity in the 
area, such as transportation, fishing and tourism to 
name a few. Increased maritime activities in 
Greenlandic waters – and in the region as such – have 
an impact on safety at sea and the risk of accidents, 
for example with tourist vessels. Even through 
climate change might lead to improved conditions for 
navigation, the Arctic still is a difficult and dangerous 
maritime environment to navigate in. And not all 
maritime actors seem to be fully aware of the risks at 
hand and prepared accordingly. Furthermore, a 
situation as the Costa Concordia incident would most 
likely have far more serious consequences in 
Greenland than it had in Italy. The activity of cruise 
ships in Greenlandic waters and in the Arctic in 
general has considerably increased in recent years, 
which leads to considerations on how to prevent 
potential disasters and how to react if things go 
wrong.  
One way to approach the situation is to create 
specific legislation to limit the risks and to ensure safe 
navigation. Since the Exxon Valdez disaster in 1989 
there has been intense work in the International 
Maritime Organizations Safety Committee on creating 
specific guidelines for safe navigation in the Arctic. In 
2002 the Maritime Safety Committee under IMO 
approved the Guidelines for Ship Operation in Arctic 
Polar Waters. However, the guidelines were not 
mandatory, but only recommendations (Engtrø et all. 
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2018, Jensen 2016). Drafting recommendations instead 
of binding legal rules lead to the inherit question of 
effectiveness of the regulation at hand. I 2007 cruise 
ship “MV Explorer” came in distress and sank in 
Antarctic waters with 100 passengers and 54 members 
of crew onboard. All were rescued, but this incident 
resulted in an intensified focus on safe navigation in 
polar waters and put pressure on IMO to act. I 2009 
the IMO has approved new guidelines on the issue, 
which were not mandatory. I 2010 the IMO started to 
work on the Polar Code, which became effective on 
01.01.2017 (Engtrø et all. 2018, Jensen 2016). The aim 
of the Polar Code is limiting risks by setting a legal 
frame for safe ship operation and environmental 
protection in the Arctic and Antarctic by primarily 
binding regulation (Østergaard/Frier 2016). The 
question at the core of this article is to what extent the 
legal frame work for safe navigation in the Arctic 
waters can improve and secure the safety of cruise 
ships. One side of improving safe navigation in 
Greenlandic waters is an efficient legal frame work, 
however, another side of the medal are practical 
issues, such as sufficient nautical charts and the 
preparedness on land (and at sea) if things go wrong. 
This article is dealing with safety and disaster 
prevention issues connected to the increased 
navigation of cruise ships in Greenlandic waters. In 
this context, both the legal frame work will be briefly 
presented as well as practical challenges for safe 
navigation of cruise ships in Greenlandic waters. 
2 SAFETY AND ACCIDENT PREVENTION 
Safety plays an important role in maritime industry 
and there has consequently been focus on safety 
issues for many years. The same goes for the research. 
The roots of safety research derive from the 19th 
century. In the beginning the focus was on technical 
improvement of equipment, for example with view to 
preventing explosions and structures from collapsing. 
(Hale & Hovden 1998). In the 1960’ies and 1970’ies the 
focus in research has been on the development of 
probabilistic risk analysis and on the human factor 
and human error, as well as on the development of 
accidents models like the so-called Swiss cheese 
model (Reason, 1997). Major disasters as Chernobyl in 
1986, Challenger in 1986, Piper Alpha in 1988 and 
Exxon Valdez in 1989 has, however, changed focus on 
management systems, procedures and organizational 
factors. The focus increased on safety management 
systems (SMS), safety culture and safety climate. 
There are different definitions of SMS. One definition 
comes from the Civil Aviation Authority, which 
defines SMS as following:  
“SMS is an organised approach to managing safety, 
including the necessary organisational structures, 
accountabilities, policies and procedures. It is more than a 
manual and a set of procedures and requires safety 
management to be integrated into the day to day activities 
of the organisation. It requires the development of an 
organisational culture that reflects the safety policy and 
objectives” (Civil Aviation Authority). 
http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/872/30JulySMS%20Guidan
ce%20Materialversion3.pdf 
The shipping industry has adopted the idea of 
SMS with the introduction of The International 
Management Code for Safe Operation of Ships and 
for Pollution Prevention called also IMS Code in 1998. 
The IMS Code obligates the shipping companies to 
formulate SMS, taking into account existing risks in 
shipping operations and guideline the seafarers to 
conduct their work safely though the procedures in 
SMS. Regulation and procedures have been seen as an 
effective way to prevent accidents, however in recent 
times there has been focus on negative sides of 
procedures as possibility to undermine good 
seamanship and to increase bureaucracy (Knudsen 
2009, DMAIB 2016, Oltedal 2011). The focus on safety 
culture and SMS is still intense, but the complexity of 
the systems makes the prevention of accidents more 
complex where SMS and safety concepts are not able 
to explain all mechanisms in the organisation. In the 
further development of the theoretical framework the 
focus is on coping with complexity of systems in 
accident prevention. The newest tend, which deals 
with this area is resilience. Resilience is defined as 
follows: “the ability of a system or an organisation to 
react to and recover from disturbances at an early 
stage, with minimal effect on the dynamic stability. 
The challenges to system safety come from instability, 
and resilience engineering is an expression of the 
methods and principles that prevent this taking 
place” (Hollnagel, Woods & Levson, 2006). The 
resilience theoretical framework also developed 
accident models, which include dynamic models, 
such as Rasmussen’s model (1997), and the safe 
envelope concept (Hale & Borys 2013). One of the 
useful concept in the newer theoretical approach are 
the concepts of Work-as-imagine (WAI) and Work-as-
done (WAD), which origin from the Francophone 
tradition and “acknowledged the difference between 
tâche and activité. Roughly translated, this is the 
difference between a (prescribed) task, or what is to 
be done, and the (actual) activity, or what is 
done“(Dekker, 2017). The concept emphasis how 
rules and regulations produced by people, who are 
not involved in actually performing the job, 
sometimes are drawn up in a way, which makes it 
difficult for the people at the “sharp end” to meet the 
demands and live up to the intention. WAI “refers to 
the various assumptions, explicit or implicit, that 
people have about how work should be done. WAD 
refers to (descriptions of) how something is actually 
done, either in a specific case or routinely”. (Hollnagel 
2017). WAI and WAD are useful concepts in exploring 
the legal frame work for safe navigation in arctic 
waters and challenges in real life. 
3 METHODS 
The study uses the qualitative methods and combines 
the traditional dogmatic legal method with sociology. 
Thus, the data consists of legislation and regulation 
on different levels, legal literature, documents and 
interviews. The legal frame work consists of the 
international (for example UNCLOS), regional (for 
example Polar Code) and national level (specific 
Greenlandic regulations). The interviews have been 
collected during the period from February 2017 until 
August 2017. The interviews were mostly conducted 
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as face-to-face expect one which was conducted by 
telephone. The interviews lasted between 60-90 
minutes interviews. Some of interviews were 
conducted as individual and some as two personas’ 
interviews. The respondents of interviews were 
maritime stakeholders and shipping companies both 
in Denmark and Greenland. All interviews were 
recoded and analyzed with help of Nvivo 11. 
4 THE LEGAL FRAME WORK FOR NAVIGATION 
IN GREENLANDIC WATERS 
4.1 UNCLOS and other regulation 
The legal regime for navigation of the oceans is set 
out in a number of international regulations (it its 
sum often called the law of the sea) with the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the 
central set of rules as the backbone. UNCLOS is often 
described as a constitution of the oceans, however, it 
is questionable, what that actually means in more 
practical terms (Feldtmann/Siig, 2018). The aim of 
UNCLOS is to provide comprehensive regulation of 
the governing of the oceans in general and more in 
particular to regulate central issues connected to the 
ocean such as the issue of free navigation, the 
distribution and use of resources, the rights and 
duties of coastal, flag and other states. Not all states 
are party to UNCLOS, however, it can be argued that 
the main principles of UNCLOS are widely accepted 
and regarded as customary international law. 
Concerning the issue of cruise ships and save 
navigation in arctic waters, UNCLOS has little specific 
to offer. UNCLOS is more relevant on a general level, 
distributing powers and obligations in connection 
with the use and governance of the oceans. One major 
principle at the core of UNCLOS is the freedom of 
navigation. This means, beyond other things, that 
limitations of and setting rules for navigation must be 
justified by other important reasons such as the safety 
at sea or the protection of the environment. Thus, a 
number of specific regulations set out rules for safe 
navigation, for example with view to the construction 
of vessels and equipment etc. as regulated in 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS).  
Another crucial issue regulated by the 
international law of the sea is the Search and Rescue 
System (SAR). This topic is only party addressed by 
UNCLOS and more specific regulated by other 
international law, in particular the International 
Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR 
Convention). The SAR Convention is supplementing 
the general obligation of ships to render assistance to 
vessels in distress, which is a deeply rooted maritime 
tradition but also codified in a number of 
international treaties. Before the SAR Convention, 
however, there was no specific international legal 
system covering search and rescue operations and the 
underlying SAR-system on land. The central elements 
of the SAR Convention are the establishment of SAR-
zones and rescue co-ordination centers and 
subcenters, as well as specific duties and rights of 
coastal states (responsible state for a given SAR zone) 
in connection preparedness and distress situations. 
The polar states USA, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, 
Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia (also called the 
“Arctic 8”) have in 2011 agreed on the Arctic Search 
and Rescue Agreement (Agreement on Cooperation 
on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue 
in the Arctic) which establishes the SAR zones of 
each state party. The Greenlandic SAR-zone, which as 
the other SAR-zones in the Arctic covers a huge area 
is, managed by the JRCC Greenland in Nuuk. 
4.2 Polar Code 
Polar Code has been, as mentioned above, developed 
to supplement already existing IMO instruments, in 
particular SOLAS and MARPOL, with aim to increase 
safe ship operation and the protection of polar 
environment. The Code consists of an introduction, 
part I and part II The Introduction contains 
mandatory provisions applicable to both parts I and 
II. Part I is subdivided into part I-A, which contains 12 
chapters on safety measures, and part I-B containing 
12 chapters about recommendations on safety. Part II 
consists of two parts A and B. Part II-A includes 
mandatory provisions on pollution prevention 
presented in 5 chapters, and part II-B containing 
recommendations on pollution prevention also in 5 
chapters. In the context of this article especially the 
first part of the Polar Code is of particular interest.  
Part I of the Polar Code introduces a number of 
mandatory safety measures. Every ship the Polar 
Code applies for should have a valid Polar Ship 
Certificate (PSC) on board, which should follow the 
model of form of certificate for ships operation in 
Polar water presented in the appendix 1 of the Code. 
The PSC includes among others information about 
ship, category of ice class, equipment. Length of 
validity of certificate ect. Besides the PSC, the Polar 
Water Operational Manual should be also on board. 
(PWOM). PWOM should include information on ship 
specific capabilities and limitation in connection to an 
assessment of the ship and its equipment. Assessment 
should be conducted in relation to operating and 
environmental conditions such as operation in low air 
temperature, in ice or in high latitude. POMW should 
address all aspects of operations described in chapter 
II part I-A. In the case that the shipping company has 
already procedures in place; there has to be reference 
from PWOM to existing procedures. Besides 
procedures describing ship operation in polar water, 
the manual has to include risk-based procedures 
about voyage planning to avoid ice, arrangements for 
receiving forecast, implementation of special 
measures, contacting emergency response providers. 
PWOM should also include risk-based procedures for 
monitoring and maintaining safety during operation 
in ice. The Polar Code gives guidelines for ship 
structure and stability depending on ship category. 
Some of the standards are obligatory for ships 
constructed after 1 January 2017. Information about 
icing allowance in the stability calculations should 
also be written in PWOM. The Polar Code describes 
specific demands to machinery installations, 
fire/safety protection, life-saving appliances, safety of 
navigation, communication, voyage planning and 
manning and training. According to Polar Code 
adequate thermal protection to all persons on board 
should be provided, which takes into account the 
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specific weather conditions of the area. The ship must 
ensure safe evacuation of the persons and provide the 
maximum expected time of rescue, which shall never 
be less than 5 days. The crew should be Certified in 
accordance with regulation II/2 of STCW Convention 
and section A-II/2 of the STCW Code (Polar Code 
12.3.2) and when operating in polar waters the ship 
should have sufficient number of crew with 
appropriate training requirements for polar waters. 
In its sum, is seems obvious that the Polar Code 
improving the safety of navigation in Arctic waters. 
However, the combination of mandatory regulation 
and non-binding regulation might lead to gaps in the 
safety system. Furthermore, some regulations can be 
perceived as weak, for example does the Polar Code 
not explicitly demands that passenger vessels provide 
for thermal survival suits for all passengers and crew.  
4.3 Mandatory Ship Reporting Systems 
One element in the preparedness-system is the 
monitoring of traffic in Greenlandic waters through a 
specific mandatory ship reporting system established 
in 2003. The system is regulated in IMO circular on 
the GREENPOS/COASTAL CONTROL (IMO 
SN/Circ. 221 of 29 May 2002; Bekendtgørelse om 
skibsrapporterings-systemer i farvandene ved 
Grønland; BEK 170/2003). 
There are basically two mandatory ship reporting 
systems establish for Greenlandic waters, in our 
context the GREENPOS-system is of particular 
interest. The GREENPOS-system applies to all ships 
on a voyage to and from Greenlandic waters and 
inside the Greenlandic continental shelf or EEZ. The 
ships are obliged to report their position, course, 
speed, and actual weather information every 6 hours. 
When joining the system, the ship must provide a 
sailing plan including the following information: 
− Ship name/call sign 
− Date and time 
− Present position 
− Course 
− Speed 
− Destination and estimated time of arrival 
− Weather and ice information and 
− Persons onbord. 
Through this reporting system the JRCC in Nuuk 
is able to have a rather clear picture of the vessels 
navigating Greenlandic waters and to get alert if 
things are not proceeding according to plan or a 
vessels is not continues to report.  
4.4 The Order for Greenland on the Safe Navigation of 
ships; order no 1697 (Bekendtgørelse for Grønland om 
skibes sikre sejlads m.v.; Bek. 1697/2015)  
The aim of the order is to enhance the safety of 
navigation in Greenland waters. The order applies for 
cargo ships with a gross tonnage of at least 150 and to 
ships carrying more than 12 passengers (order no 
1697). For passenger ships carrying more than 250 
certain particular strict rules apply. Warships etc. and 
other state vessels which are not used for commercial 
service are not covered by the provisions in chapter 3 
of the order concerning safety requirements. 
According to the order Greenland is divided in two 
navigations zones: the northern and southern 
navigation zone. All ships navigating Greenlandic 
waters have to observe ice in every area with ice 
presence. The speed should be adjusted and ice 
searchlight should be used in darkness. Ships shall 
keep a safe distance from icebergs. During the 
planning of the ship’s voyage the master has to take 
into account the following:  
− The safety procedures of the ship's safety 
management system related to navigation in Arctic 
waters; 
− any restrictions in the information in nautical 
charts and aids to navigation; 
− information about the extension and type of ice 
and icebergs in the vicinity of the planned voyage 
on an ongoing basis; 
− statistical information about ice and temperatures 
from previous years; 
− any possible places of refuge where the ship may 
be protected or receive assistance; 
− any sea areas designated especially protected areas 
in the vicinity of the route; and  
− voyages in areas with limited search and rescue 
facilities. (order no 1697) 
Navigation is prohibited in areas delimited in the 
nautical charts by a dotted line with information 
about “numerous rock”. Navigation in areas given in 
the chart “foul” or “unsurveyed” is only allowed if 
the ships follows previously used tracks that the 
master has assessed would have a sufficient safety 
margin to relation to the ship’s greatest draught and 
width and the trip takes place in daylight and with 
“good visibility”. Ships should have at least one 
person on board with the necessary local knowledge 
of the water to be navigated. The person should have 
the qualification that would entitle him/her to 
navigate the ship concerned or to be trained to have 
several years’ experience navigating ships of similar 
size.  
For passenger vessels carrying more than 250 
passengers in the inner and outer territorial waters of 
Greenland it is mandatory to employ pilot services; in 
this context it may be noted that the territorial waters 
of Greenland are 3 nm. The pilot must be certificated 
to perform pilotage assignments in the area 
concerned. The vessel can get permission to navigate 
without a pilot, if the applicant documents the 
necessary qualifications and experience navigating in 
the Polar waters.  
According to the order, ships should have an ice 
class, corresponding to the ice, which it is navigating. 
The ships have to follow the recommended routes 
around Nuuk. With connection to voyage planning, it 
is necessary for the master and shipping company to 
document the possibility to be assisted by other ships 
or SAR facilities within reasonable period of time and 
with sufficient rescue capacity (order chapter 4 § 15). 
Furthermore, the crew must have a proper training. 
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5 PRACTICAL CHALLENGES 
5.1 Emergency preparedness  
The biggest challenge in the Greenlandic waters is 
emergency preparedness. The infrastructure in 
Greenland is very limited. The only hospital is in 
Nuuk and the hospital does not have the capacity to 
accommodate patients from a cruise ship with 2000 
passengers and crew. The nearest hospitals in the 
region are in Iceland and the nearest hospitals in the 
Danish are in Denmark, many hours away by plane. 
The emergency preparedness is limited to a small 
number of naval vessels of different sizes ships and 
helicopters and planes. The Greenlandic airline Air 
Greenland is in case of an emergency obliged to 
support possible rescue and evacuation operations 
with its aircrafts. The biggest challenge is here, that 
the airline has only one larger aircraft with a capacity 
of about 200 people, which can be used in an 
emergency. Furthermore, there is only one larger 
airport, in Kangerlussuaq in West Greenland, where 
this kind of aircraft can land and take off. Other 
Greenlandic airports have only capacity and runways 
for smaller aircrafts (for about 30-40 passengers).  
5.2 Survival chances 
The climate in Greenland is cold, changeable and 
complex due to ever-changing presents of ice. The 
weather can change rapidly from sunshine and good 
conditions for navigations to frog and challenging 
conditions. The waters around Greenland are cold the 
all year around and survival in the water is basically 
impossible. According to Polar Code a passenger 
should be able to survive not less than 5 days, 
however the exercises conducted in Svalbard, which 
to some degree is comparable to Greenland, has 
shown that the life-boats have certain limitations and 
passengers will most likely not survive for five days. 
Participants in the exercise SARex1 had to leave the 
lifeboats after 24 hours due too cold temperature and 
insufficient insulation on the bottom of the boat. The 
more resent exercise SARex2 has shown improved 
technology and better insulation at the bottom of the 
lifeboats, but another challenge was fresh air. It seems 
impossible to remain the proper level of oxygen in a 
covered lifeboat without opening “the roof” which 
has an impact on the ability to secure proper 
temperature for passengers (Solberg 2016 and 2017). 
The results of those exercises have shown with quite 
some clarity the challenges of surviving in Arctic 
waters for 5 days with the existing technology.  
Another challenge in connection with the survival 
of cruise ship passengers if things go wrong is the 
physical condition and age of at least some of the 
passengers, who should be evacuated. The average 
age of passengers on cruise ships is rather high and 
not all passengers are very mobile, which makes it 
much more difficult to evacuate.  
An accident report from Danish Maritime 
Accident Investigation Board (DMAIB) from 2016 
illustrates another challenge with the growing 
industry of cruise ships: we have not only seen an 
increase of large cruise ships navigating Greenlandic 
waters, but also a growing industry of smaller tourist 
boats offering activities to cruise ship’s passengers. 
One of those smaller vessels got in distress in 
Greenlandic waters and subsequently sunk and the 
biggest challenge in the rescue operation was to 
evacuate passengers. There was no space on the 
vessels deck where 23 passengers could be able to 
dress into the survival suit. The report raises therefore 
the general question whether it is possible to evacuate 
the passengers from this kind of vessels (DMAIB 
2016). 
5.3 Navigational challenges and limitations 
Greenlandic waters cover an area of about ca. 2 
million km2. In this large geographical area radio 
communication can be influence by atmospheric and 
magnetic disturbances. Furthermore, magnet 
compasses could be useless in (parts of) the region 
and gyrocompasses could be unreliable. To add to the 
complication, some parts of the Greenlandic waters 
have not been fully measured and nautical charts can 
be rather unreliable. There are currently no sufficient 
digital nautical charts, which adds to the difficulties 
of navigating the region.  
Furthermore, complicated ice conditions are a 
challenge all year around and for example some 
forms of ice or underwater iceberg are not visible on 
radar. The weather is in general very unstable and 
unpredictable, which further adds to navigational 
risks. 
However, our research seems to indicate that not 
all parts of the cruise ship industry are fully aware of 
the particular risks and challenges of navigating in 
arctic waters. And it seems that they are willing to 
take some risks to provide their customers an unique 
experience. 
6 SUMMING UP 
The legal system guiding safe navigation of cruise 
ships (and other vessels) in and around Greenlandic 
waters can be described as fragmented for at least 
three reasons: First, the legal regime for navigation is 
set in different legal acts under the law of the sea, 
some of those are of a general nature, some of those 
are specific to navigation in polar/arctic waters. 
Second, the legal regime for safe navigation is not 
only guided by international law, but also by regional 
and national rules. Third, some of the “law” guiding 
safe navigation in the Arctic is not binding and 
therefore issues of effectiveness must be addressed. 
This means in sum, that the legal framework for 
cruise ships in the Arctic is complex.  
This complex legal system is one side of the medal, 
the other side are the practical conditions and 
circumstances influencing safe navigation at sea and 
the preparedness-system in place. The analysis of the 
practical challenges has shown that the existing 
legislation cannot stand alone and furthermore leaves 
some gaps. There is for example a gap between “work 
as imagine” – as described in the Polar Code – and 
“work as done” – as seen in the realities of navigating 
Greenlandic waters. Furthermore, there are some very 
specific conditions and challenges influencing 
navigation in Arctic waters. The legal frame work 
212 
tries to address some of those, but this need to be 
mirrored by training, sufficient equipment and 
effective structures on land. And at the end of the day 
there will always be a certain risk navigating Arctic 
waters 
7 CONCLUSION 
Our study has shown that there is a body of general 
and specific regulation on different levels governing 
safe navigation in Arctic waters and that this 
regulation to some degree has indeed improved the 
safety of navigation. This fragmented legal frame 
work addresses some of the existing risks which must 
be taken into account and sets a frame for the SAR-
system and the preparedness on land. However, we 
have also identified certain short-comings, challenges 
and gaps connected to the existing legal frame work. 
Furthermore, it is important to note, that the legal 
frame work cannot stand alone. In fact, in the 
Greenlandic context an number of practical challenges 
can be identified, which legislation is not able to 
address fully – to name the central challenges: first, a 
systematic education program for safe navigation in 
Greenlandic waters for foreign shipping companies is 
lacking. Second, digital nautical charts for 
Greenlandic waters are not completely developed yet 
and there are currently a lot of gaps in the existing 
nautical charts. Third, possibly the biggest challenge 
for navigating Greenlandic waters is still the complex 
weather and ice conditions, which means that 
knowledge and experience is a crucial part in safe 
navigation.  
In addition, the infrastructure at land in Greenland 
is insufficient and not fully developed. It seems 
therefore quite unlikely, that a major incident with a 
large cruise ship of 2000-4000 passengers could be 
effectively and sufficiently handled. 
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